F
Frodo
I know someone that needs about 10 hard drives wiped.
What programs come with the ability to wipe drives?
What programs come with the ability to wipe drives?
Frodo said:I know someone that needs about 10 hard drives wiped.
What programs come with the ability to wipe drives?
Frodo said:I know someone that needs about 10 hard drives wiped.
What programs come with the ability to wipe drives?
Frodo said:I know someone that needs about 10 hard drives wiped.
What programs come with the ability to wipe drives?
Frodo said:I know someone that needs about 10 hard drives wiped.
What programs come with the ability to wipe drives?
You could pop in a bootable linux CD (such as Knoppix) and execute
cp /dev/urandom /dev/hda
(or sda, if they're scsi drives).
May sound cumbersome, but one way or the other I think you'll have to
boot from a CD or other drive. Getting a *running* OS to throughly nuke
itself from the HD is problematic.
Arno Wagner said:Using /dev/zero as source is entriely enough and several times
faster.
Use
dd_rescue -w /dev/zero /dev/hda
Previously Timothy Daniels said:Writing zeroes is not as secure as writing random bits.
The choice may depend on the type of info on the drive and
how valuable it is.
Timothy Daniels said:Writing zeroes is not as secure as writing random bits.
Nonsense.
The choice may depend on the type of info on the drive and how valuable
it is.
*TimDaniels*
timeOday said:You could pop in a bootable linux CD (such as Knoppix) and execute
cp /dev/urandom /dev/hda
(or sda, if they're scsi drives).
May sound cumbersome, but one way or the other I think you'll have to
boot from a CD or other drive. Getting a *running* OS to throughly nuke
itself from the HD is problematic.
Arno Wagner said:That seems intuitive. But that is not enough. With current
(and 10 years or so back) HDD technology, zeros are likely as
secure as random bits, since one overwrite with whatever
data makes the old data unrecoverable. If you have different
information, please cite, but be warned that there is no evidence
anybody can do it. There is evidence that it is infeasible or
needs extreme effort at the least.
Timothy Daniels said:Arno Wagner wrote
the U.S. Department of Defense, I have read in several
magazine articles over the years, requires a minimum
number of random data overwrites, not just one overwrite,
and not the same data over and over.
The reason is that not all the magnetic domains are set or re-set on a write, and some of them
remain in the original orientation.
Sophisticated intrumentation can ignore the strong overwrite data if it knows what it will be and
then just read the weak background signal from the overwritten data.
The key is knowing what the overwrite data is - which consistent overwriting provides. The
difficulty is then increased when the overwrite data is unpredictable.
Of course, one could read the overwrite data and then go back and filter that out of the overall
signal, and that is the reason for multiple overwrites -
Nope.
at some point it becomes impossible to determine
which level of overwrite is being read, and one can't tell
which data was the original - it all becomes just noise.
So, for less than "national technological means", multiple
overwrites with random data will hide the underlying data.
Of course, "national technological means" are not described for everyone to read, but I have read
that there is some slop-over in bit magnetism that reaches outside the normally readable data
tracks.
Also, there can be variances in placement of write heads in normal manufacturing and also due to
normal wear.
If the overwriting was not done with the same write head that wrote the original data,
the slop-overs will have different placement,
and the original data slop-over can be distinguished from the overwrite data's slop-over.
In normal practice, though, multiple random data overwrites should suffice to hide any sensitive
data.
How MANY overwrites? Mmmmm..... *I'd* use three.
Previously Timothy Daniels said:the U.S. Department of Defense, I have read in several
magazine articles over the years, requires a minimum
number of random data overwrites, not just one overwrite,
and not the same data over and over.
The reason is that not all the magnetic domains are set
or re-set on a write, and some of them remain in the
original orientation. Sophisticated intrumentation can
ignore the strong overwrite data if it knows what it will
be and then just read the weak background signal from
the overwritten data. The key is knowing what the
overwrite data is - which consistent overwriting provides.
The difficulty is then increased when the overwrite data is
unpredictable. Of course, one could read the overwrite
data and then go back and filter that out of the overall
signal, and that is the reason for multiple overwrites -
at some point it becomes impossible to determine
which level of overwrite is being read, and one can't tell
which data was the original - it all becomes just noise.
So, for less than "national technological means", multiple
overwrites with random data will hide the underlying data.
Of course, "national technological means" are not described
for everyone to read, but I have read that there is some
slop-over in bit magnetism that reaches outside the normally
readable data tracks. Also, there can be variances in placement
of write heads in normal manufacturing and also due to normal
wear. If the overwriting was not done with the same write head
that wrote the original data, the slop-overs will have different
placement, and the original data slop-over can be distinguished
from the overwrite data's slop-over.
In normal practice, though, multiple random data overwrites
should suffice to hide any sensitive data. How MANY overwrites?
Mmmmm..... *I'd* use three.
One pass with zeroes does the job today.
Timothy Daniels said:Do whatever you want, old man.
Timothy Daniels said:Arno says
For your purposes, that should suffice.
But I'm sure there are forensic
technicians who are smiling at that.
Timothy Daniels said:It's interesting that both you guys are foreigners, and you're both saying "Prove it".