Wiping a hard drive?

  • Thread starter Thread starter Frodo
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Frodo

I know someone that needs about 10 hard drives wiped.
What programs come with the ability to wipe drives?
 
Frodo said:
I know someone that needs about 10 hard drives wiped.
What programs come with the ability to wipe drives?

If they are really concerned, a hammer does a great job.

For the sake of the cost of a new drive....


Odie
 
Frodo said:
I know someone that needs about 10 hard drives wiped.
What programs come with the ability to wipe drives?

The answer the other person got just yesterday did not suit you?
 
I believe the owner of the 10 hard drives want to sell them with the used
computers the hard drives came in.
 
Frodo said:
I know someone that needs about 10 hard drives wiped.
What programs come with the ability to wipe drives?

You could pop in a bootable linux CD (such as Knoppix) and execute

cp /dev/urandom /dev/hda
(or sda, if they're scsi drives).


May sound cumbersome, but one way or the other I think you'll have to
boot from a CD or other drive. Getting a *running* OS to throughly nuke
itself from the HD is problematic.
 
You could pop in a bootable linux CD (such as Knoppix) and execute
cp /dev/urandom /dev/hda
(or sda, if they're scsi drives).

May sound cumbersome, but one way or the other I think you'll have to
boot from a CD or other drive. Getting a *running* OS to throughly nuke
itself from the HD is problematic.

Using /dev/zero as source is entriely enough and several times
faster.

Use

dd_rescue -w /dev/zero /dev/hda

to get a progress report while the blanking is running.

Arno
 
Arno Wagner said:
Using /dev/zero as source is entriely enough and several times
faster.

Use

dd_rescue -w /dev/zero /dev/hda


Writing zeroes is not as secure as writing random bits. The choice
may depend on the type of info on the drive and how valuable it is.

*TimDaniels*
 
Previously Timothy Daniels said:
Writing zeroes is not as secure as writing random bits.

That seems intuitive. But that is not enough. With current
(and 10 years or so back) HDD technology, zeros are likely as
secure as random bits, since one overwrite with whatever
data makes the old data unrecoverable. If you have different
information, please cite, but be warned that there is no evidence
anybody can do it. There is evidence that it is infeasible or
needs extreme effort at the least.
The choice may depend on the type of info on the drive and
how valuable it is.

Actually: No. You cannot quantify how much more secure, random
data is (and whether it is more secure at all) so the choice
cannot be made with rational grounds.

Arno
 
Timothy Daniels said:
Writing zeroes is not as secure as writing random bits.
Nonsense.

The choice may depend on the type of info on the drive and how valuable
it is.

*TimDaniels*
 
timeOday said:
You could pop in a bootable linux CD (such as Knoppix) and execute

cp /dev/urandom /dev/hda
(or sda, if they're scsi drives).


May sound cumbersome, but one way or the other I think you'll have to
boot from a CD or other drive. Getting a *running* OS to throughly nuke
itself from the HD is problematic.

It's quite simple actually.
Just requires a simple app that does no checks and simply does what the
operator asks it to do. All you need to have is access to raw sectors like
any disk/sector editor has.
 
Arno Wagner said:
That seems intuitive. But that is not enough. With current
(and 10 years or so back) HDD technology, zeros are likely as
secure as random bits, since one overwrite with whatever
data makes the old data unrecoverable. If you have different
information, please cite, but be warned that there is no evidence
anybody can do it. There is evidence that it is infeasible or
needs extreme effort at the least.


the U.S. Department of Defense, I have read in several
magazine articles over the years, requires a minimum
number of random data overwrites, not just one overwrite,
and not the same data over and over.

The reason is that not all the magnetic domains are set
or re-set on a write, and some of them remain in the
original orientation. Sophisticated intrumentation can
ignore the strong overwrite data if it knows what it will
be and then just read the weak background signal from
the overwritten data. The key is knowing what the
overwrite data is - which consistent overwriting provides.
The difficulty is then increased when the overwrite data is
unpredictable. Of course, one could read the overwrite
data and then go back and filter that out of the overall
signal, and that is the reason for multiple overwrites -
at some point it becomes impossible to determine
which level of overwrite is being read, and one can't tell
which data was the original - it all becomes just noise.
So, for less than "national technological means", multiple
overwrites with random data will hide the underlying data.

Of course, "national technological means" are not described
for everyone to read, but I have read that there is some
slop-over in bit magnetism that reaches outside the normally
readable data tracks. Also, there can be variances in placement
of write heads in normal manufacturing and also due to normal
wear. If the overwriting was not done with the same write head
that wrote the original data, the slop-overs will have different
placement, and the original data slop-over can be distinguished
from the overwrite data's slop-over.

In normal practice, though, multiple random data overwrites
should suffice to hide any sensitive data. How MANY overwrites?
Mmmmm..... *I'd* use three.

*TimDaniels*
 
Timothy Daniels said:
Arno Wagner wrote
the U.S. Department of Defense, I have read in several
magazine articles over the years, requires a minimum
number of random data overwrites, not just one overwrite,
and not the same data over and over.

Irrelevant to what is actually required. That is just a belt and
braces approach which can be justified when its only done
very rarely and the data is very important. That is never true
with the average personal PC, even one used in business.
The reason is that not all the magnetic domains are set or re-set on a write, and some of them
remain in the original orientation.

Doesnt matter.
Sophisticated intrumentation can ignore the strong overwrite data if it knows what it will be and
then just read the weak background signal from the overwritten data.

Easy to claim, child.
The key is knowing what the overwrite data is - which consistent overwriting provides. The
difficulty is then increased when the overwrite data is unpredictable.

Easy to claim, child. Not a shred of evidence that its even possible.
Of course, one could read the overwrite data and then go back and filter that out of the overall
signal, and that is the reason for multiple overwrites -
Nope.

at some point it becomes impossible to determine
which level of overwrite is being read, and one can't tell
which data was the original - it all becomes just noise.

Easy to claim, child.
So, for less than "national technological means", multiple
overwrites with random data will hide the underlying data.

Just as true of a single pass of zeros too.
Of course, "national technological means" are not described for everyone to read, but I have read
that there is some slop-over in bit magnetism that reaches outside the normally readable data
tracks.

Some fools claim that the CIA executed Kennedy too.

'I have read' cuts no mustard, child.
Also, there can be variances in placement of write heads in normal manufacturing and also due to
normal wear.

Wrong with servo drives, and they are all servo drives now.
If the overwriting was not done with the same write head that wrote the original data,

There isnt any other possibility, stupid.
the slop-overs will have different placement,

Only in your pathetic little pig ignorant fantasyland.
and the original data slop-over can be distinguished from the overwrite data's slop-over.

Only in your pathetic little pig ignorant fantasyland.
In normal practice, though, multiple random data overwrites should suffice to hide any sensitive
data.

Single zero data overwrite is suffice to hide any sensitive data.
How MANY overwrites? Mmmmm..... *I'd* use three.

And that number is plucked from your arse, as always.
 
Previously Timothy Daniels said:
the U.S. Department of Defense, I have read in several
magazine articles over the years, requires a minimum
number of random data overwrites, not just one overwrite,
and not the same data over and over.

Have you also looked at how old "DOD wipe" is? It was specified
way before current HDD technology! AFAIK ist was originally
designed for floppies, were this level of paranoia is actually
needed.
The reason is that not all the magnetic domains are set
or re-set on a write, and some of them remain in the
original orientation. Sophisticated intrumentation can
ignore the strong overwrite data if it knows what it will
be and then just read the weak background signal from
the overwritten data. The key is knowing what the
overwrite data is - which consistent overwriting provides.
The difficulty is then increased when the overwrite data is
unpredictable. Of course, one could read the overwrite
data and then go back and filter that out of the overall
signal, and that is the reason for multiple overwrites -
at some point it becomes impossible to determine
which level of overwrite is being read, and one can't tell
which data was the original - it all becomes just noise.
So, for less than "national technological means", multiple
overwrites with random data will hide the underlying data.

Sorry. This worked with HDD technologies that did not reach the
data storage capacity of the surface. Modern HDDs do and the
argumentation does not apply anymore.
Of course, "national technological means" are not described
for everyone to read, but I have read that there is some
slop-over in bit magnetism that reaches outside the normally
readable data tracks. Also, there can be variances in placement
of write heads in normal manufacturing and also due to normal
wear. If the overwriting was not done with the same write head
that wrote the original data, the slop-overs will have different
placement, and the original data slop-over can be distinguished
from the overwrite data's slop-over.

That is relevant for floppies mostly, since they use stepper motors.
And for yery old HDDs and removable disks (>15 years or so).
In normal practice, though, multiple random data overwrites
should suffice to hide any sensitive data. How MANY overwrites?
Mmmmm..... *I'd* use three.

One pass with zeroes does the job today. For floppies it was _not_
enough. For stepper-based HDDs it might just have been enough or not.
For todays moving coil, precision positioned, surface data capacity
reaching HDDs, writing anything at all is enough.

Arno
 
It's interesting that both you guys are foreigners, and you're
both saying "Prove it".

*TimDaniels*
 
Arno says:
One pass with zeroes does the job today.

For your purposes, that should suffice.
But I'm sure there are forensic
technicians who are smiling at that.

*TimDaniels*
 
Timothy Daniels said:
It's interesting that both you guys are foreigners, and you're both saying "Prove it".

Never ever could bullshit its way out of a wet paper bag.
 
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