K
keith
Intel thought it was taking the best ideas available at the time it
started the project. IBM had a huge investment in VLIW, and Elbrus
was making wild claims about what it could do.
IBM never had a "huge investment" in VLIW. It was a research project, at
best. OTOH, Intel has a *huge* investment in VLIW, and it's a bus
that isn't going anywhere. It's too easy for us hardware folks to toss of
the hard problems to the compiler folk. History shows that this isn't a
good plan. Even if Intel *could* have pulled it off, where was the
incentive for the customers? They have a business to run and
processor technology isn't generally part of it.
Somebody who doesn't actually do computer architecture probably has a
very poor idea of all the constraints that operate in that universe, but
I'll stick with my notion that Intel/HP's mistake was that they had a
clean sheet of paper and let too much coffee get spilled on it from too
many different people.
That was one, perhaps a big one. Intel's real problem, as I see it, is
that they didn't understand their customers. I've told the FS stories
here before. FS was doomed because the customers had no use for it and
they spoke *loudly*. Itanic is no different, except that Intel didn't
listen to their customers. They had a different agenda than their
customers; not a good position to be in.
Nobody needs a home computer, and worldwide demand for computers will be
five units.
640Kb is enough for anyone, yada-yada-yada. It's all about missing the
point. Customers rule, architects don't.
The advantages of streaming processors is low power consumption and high throughput.
You keep saying that, but so far you're alone in the woods. Maybe for the
codes you're interested in, you're right. ...but for most of us there are
surprises in life. We don't live it linearly.
The belief was (I think) that the front end part was sufficiently
repetitive that it could be massaged heavily to deliver a very clean
instruction stream to the back end. The concept isn't completely wrong,
just not sufficiently right.
I worked (tangentially) on the original TMTA product. The "proof of
concept" was on MS Word. Let's call it "VC irrational exuberance". Yes
there was lots learned there, some of it interesting, but it came at a
time when Dr. Moore was still quite alive. Brute force won.
That's what IBM (and Intel and probably Transmeta, although they never
admitted it) probably wanted to do. For free, you should get runtime
feedback-directed optimization to make up for the overhead of morphing.
That's the theory, anyway. Exception and recovery may not be the
biggest problem, but it's one big problem I know about.
As usual, theory says that it and reality are the same. Reality has a
different opinion.