<cough>
See
http://cquirke.mvps.org/9x/mimehole.htm, Google( BadTrans B )
That's a very old bug, long fixed unless you "just" re-installed any
OS predating XP, as every such OS uses an IE that is both exploitable
and too "old" to be patched other than by upgrading the whole of IE.
If you read up that bug, you'd see how the nature of exploits and code
bugs have changed.
The MIME hole was a design safety failure, not a code defect - IOW, it
"worked as designed" but the design was brain-dead.
There's still design failures in Windows, and until these are proven
to be exploitable, they won't be patched because "it's working the way
we expected it to". Most exploits that are being patched today are
genuine code defects, and may be harder to exploit.
Then again, the modern malware industry is optimised to overcome any
"an attacker would have to..." mitigations. Once an exploit shape is
found, the source code becomes rapidly available, and malware coders
then drop it straight into attack vehicles that are ready to roll;
either full-fledged multi-function bots, or simple stubs that can pull
down the "real" malware. If these malware haven't been released
before, av won't "know" them at the signature level.
Malware can always out-turn patching. The attacks are smaller than
the patches and can drown out the patching process by sheer volume,
even before you consider DDoSing the fewer number of patching sources
or poisoning the patch pool via fake patching sources.
The other reason malware will always win the race is that the required
software standards are far lower. A malware has to work on some PCs,
and it doesn't matter if it trashes others. But a patch has to work
on all systerms, and not cause new problems of any of them.
If you insist on butting heads with malware on a level playing field,
you will always lose. Better to tilt the playing field so that the
user at the keyboard has the ability to trump all code and remote
access - but MS's fixation on centrally-managed IT and DRM undermines
this and rots the top of the Trust Stack.
See
http://cquirke.blogspot.com/2006/08/trust-stack.html
Then how do you explain the record breaking time to patch Microsoft's DRM
hole? Three days to patch? Please explain (no propaganda necessary).
Well, it could be that the nature of the hole was trivial to fix -
e.g. simply changing some static "secret" info that became harvested
and used by the attackers. I suspect this is the case, given how
quickly the fix has been circumvented by the attackers.
We have a very small sample from which to draw conclusions. Sure, we
have a lot of defects that allow user interests to be attacked, and we
have a smaller number where users were left hanging out to try while
patching caught up with ITW exploits. But we have a sample of 1
prompt DRM fix, and it may just happen to have been an easy one to
fix; maybe the next one (or even the continuation of this one) will
take a far longer time to fix. If so, don't expect to read about it!
So... are you saying that all fixes should be held back the same
amount of time, even if they are ready earlier, so that MS can be seen
to act more promptly on the issues we'd most like to see fixed first?
BTW, the post I'm replying to has a ?bug of its own; the sole
newsgroup set for replies is not found to exist on my news server.
Maybe it exists on other news servers, who knows? Here, it's 100%
broken and buggy. Should I wave this around as "proof" that the
poster I'm replying to is trying to hide refutations to his post?
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Drugs are usually safe. Inject? (Y/n)