R
Robin Bruce
I don't understand how you can have a 2GHz 'gap'. What's so good about
a high clock rate, anyway?
Robin
a high clock rate, anyway?
Robin
I don't understand how you can have a 2GHz 'gap'. What's so good about
a high clock rate, anyway?
YKhan said:was in fact pushing it at that time. IBM was also fully behind the
later 386.
Workstations at $10k+ a pop are never going to let you rule the world.
Only a little bit later? PowerPC was introduced in 91 or 92.
You're seriously trying to feed me this crap about IBM having PowerPCs
around 1985, when the 386 was first introduced, and you expect anyone
to take you seriously? By the time PowerPC was introduce, it was
competing against 486's and the first of the Pentiums.
Jim Brooks wrote On 09/23/05 11:11,:
The multithread model already runs each thread opportunistically.
Timer interupts already occur on instruction boundaries.
Move a broken priority model from software to hardware. For what
speed advantage ?
- sub-threads
Support for parallel programming.
A reduced 80386 Task-State Segment (TSS) will be defined
(avoid saving unnecessary registers such as ES/FS/GS)
A variant of JUMP [TSS] with a new Thread bit defined in the TSS
will spawn a sub-thread (analoguous to a UNIX child process).
The sub-thread can stop by IRET [TSS].
A new WAIT [TSS] will synchronize the parent with its sub-thread.
- thread exceptions
A thread can raise exceptions to end or suspend itself.
These are all software features. There is no reason to move
the slowest parts of thread management to hardware, such as scheduling
of same.
Doubt it, but hey...
SUN.
Yea, lets optimize the least used section of the instruction set.
Don't be silly.
Either you are very young, or your memory is failing. Let me remind
you.
Back in the early 1980s, there were several chips fighting it out
for the workstation market. Intel's 8086 wasn't up to it and even
the 80286 was pretty marginal - the 68000 and 68010 were rapidly
becoming the dominant chips in the high-end market. What stopped
them from becoming dominant was that no company produced a 68K-based
workstation that was both relatively cheap and with working software.
Sun and Apollo established themselves because their systems
more-or-less worked. There were much cheaper 68K boxes, but their
software was crap, and they didn't have the third-party support.
There were at least a dozen companies in the world who could have
put together a decent 68K-based system over a year before the 80386
became viable. None did.
Only a little bit later, IBM and Motorola set up the PowerPC project.
Let's skip over the long and complex details, but the facts of the
matter were that IBM had viable systems a full year before the 80386
became viable, but wouldn't release them. And the PowerPC consortium
was really quite big at that stage, including Apple and most of the
Tier 2 vendors at least having taken out options. And please note
that Intel and Microsoft combined were small compared to IBM back in
the days of the 80286.
(a) See above and (b) read what I posted. For a system to be viable,
it has to have software as well as hardware. Not merely was the
80386 late, but the software to take advantage of it took ages to
arrive.
The PowerPC was not competing against the 80386 as something to run
Windows 3.1 on, but as something to run a more serious operating
system. And that didn't happen until the very end of the 80386's
life, except in a few specialist systems. I take your point that
the real competition was the 486, but that changes little.
|>
|> You probably know this but
|>
|> If my memory serves me well, 2 of those were not failed, at least not
|> during their heyday they were quite successful selling in the millions
|> mark when a million actually meant something. One of them is alive and
|> well inside your settop box (that must mean many many millions at 70%
|> market share) but don't ask ST to name it, it hurts too much to say the
|> word.
Yes. What the x86 fanatics miss is that there are a large number
of designs that could perfectly well have prevented its rise, or
toppled it from its perch and taken over during one of its more
vulnerable periods. Its success was always more a matter of luck
(and incompetence by the opposition) than merit.
In addition to those systems and the Alpha, there was the 68K range and
PowerPC, which both came VERY close to blocking the rise of the x86 and
toppling it, respectively. We know why they didn't, too, and the
reasons were not architectural.
Nowadays, with the patent system preventing innovation by new companies
and established companies not being prepared to tackle new
general-purpose architectures, I doubt that anything could make headway
until the x86 collapses of its own accord. Unless, of course, that
China says "sod you" to the USA over patents and starts innovating
itself.
never saw you without long pants.
Too cold for shorts up there in the green mts?
Or you just can't spell?
Chris said:IBM was only behind the 386 to the extent that it didn't cannibalise any of
their existing products markets.
YKhan said:Which market exactly was the 386 going to cannibalize? The 286 market?
Nick said:You could buy several 68K-based ones for c. $5K, which was only
40% more than the $3.5K you needed for an IBM PC, and they could
do several times as much. Or could have done, if the software
actually worked.
You are posting as an outsider. I am not. My point is that IBM
could have delivered a lot earlier than they did.
(a) See above and (b) read what I posted. For a system to be viable,
it has to have software as well as hardware. Not merely was the
80386 late, but the software to take advantage of it took ages to
arrive.
The PowerPC was not competing against the 80386 as something to run
Windows 3.1 on, but as something to run a more serious operating
system. And that didn't happen until the very end of the 80386's
life, except in a few specialist systems. I take your point that
the real competition was the 486, but that changes little.
I'm certainly not young and I have a very good memory of my own experience.
Remember (did you even know) Definicon? They sold a PC add-in card with
68020, 68882 and 1MB(2MB option, IIRC) memory - it was reasonably priced
and before 80386 was a viable route to 32-bit address space and what we
thought was great performance. Admittedly it was saddled with the ISA-16
bus to talk to the PC system for I/O but the compilers worked well and
produced reasonably efficient code - I checked.
I still remember the day I got our first 16MHz 80386/80387, with 2MB memory
and ran a comparison of our LP software against the 20MHz Definicon
68020... excitedly hoping for confirmation of the superiority of the 68020.
What a let down - the 80386/8037, even at 16MHz blew the 20MHz 68020/68882
away... no contest.
The 68020 failed because it was not competent.
The Intel CPUs succeeded because Intel supplied a "kit" which worked - they
documented all the layout & bus loadings down to resistors and capacitors,
supplied the support chips and compared with Moto 68020 and especially
NS16032/32032, it was like painting by numbers to build a working system.
I think you have your dates a bit muxed ip - we had 80386 and Phar Lap's
DOS Extender in 1986; I didn't get a sniff of even a Risc/6k until 1990.
Are you sure you're not thinking of the PC RT/Risc systems?
You are missing one point: the cost of software was prohibitive (aka,
priced assuming rich business customers). In a slightly later time frame
(early 90s), my father bought a Win 3.1 PC+CAD s/w+pspice to do (analog)
circuit design (as a consultant). He considered workstations, but the cost
of the equivalent s/w was many thousands of dollars higher (more like in
$10'000 increments, but I can't remember the precise numbers). The PC s/w
was more in the low thousands of dollars price range.
Ancient history. 68K had a chance, though they blew it. PowerPC as an
x86 killer was a dream. Remember 615?
You see, this is exactly my point about the comp.arch beatniks -- they
prefer to live in a peppermint world it seems. Something that's "only
40% more" than something else is nothing short of a dismal failure.
YKhan said:Which market exactly was the 386 going to cannibalize? The 286 market?
Only a little bit later, IBM and Motorola set up the PowerPC project.
Let's skip over the long and complex details, but the facts of the
matter were that IBM had viable systems a full year before the 80386
became viable, but wouldn't release them. And the PowerPC consortium
was really quite big at that stage, including Apple and most of the
Tier 2 vendors at least having taken out options. And please note
that Intel and Microsoft combined were small compared to IBM back in
the days of the 80286.
If I were to get $1 billion together, design a CPU that outperformed
the x86 10:1 and build it into a system, what chance would I have of
selling it without being smothered in lawsuits? Get real.
Nick said:For a system to be viable, it has to have software as well as
hardware. Not merely was the 80386 late, but the software to
take advantage of it took ages to arrive.