There is no way for them to know whether there is a second container.
Yes. But do they need to care? My point is they can just
procceed on the assumption that there is one, becasue after
all "its the feature why somebody would use TrueCrupt".
No matter that this is not the truth.
For that matter, there is no way for them to know on any given computer
whether there is a Truecrypt container at all.
Depends. If encrypted OS is used, it is rather obvious. If not,
the TrueCrypt binaries will be installed. If it is really just
the container and no software _and_ the container is not
mapped to a file (no idea how to do that under Windows),
then they can still find out that there is possible encrypted
data, and procceed on the assumption that there is indeed.
Hence my statement that any unused space should be overwritten
wit zeros and not random data.
You don't need to have
Truecrypt resident on the machine. You could have the container in
some innocuous file buried deep in the filesystem
Not good. Compressed data and possibly encrypted data can
distinguished automatiovally (by detecting the compresseion
algorithm, of which there are not so many). Entropy of good
compressed date is close to encrypted data, but there is still
structure.
and the program files
needed for decryption on a remote server that you can download later
after you get through Checkpoint Charlie.
If the encrypoted container is small, this may work. But in that
case why not have the whole data on that remote server? If the
encrypted data is larger, this will draw attention on any
reasonable autometed search.
Bottom line: Encryption only really protects you if they do not
have the right to demand the key. That is why this freedom is so
important. Look at the UK: If you claim to have forgotten the key,
or if you use my method of blanking disk drives (map in cryptsetup
with random key and then overwerite with zeros), and they have
any uspicion (which is easy to generate or fake, nobody says they
are playing fair and often they do not), you can go to prison for
a few months. This can happen to you for doing something that
only _looks_ like plausible deniability. Just call you a
"terror sympathiser" or something like that and it will be easy to
do to you. And they even have motive: If nobody dares to use
the plausible deniability defense, their job gets easier.
Arno