The document you use to do the migration is some 200 pages long. There are
wizards, but sometimes what looks like a simple paragraph requires hours of
work. The amazing thing is that you do this between two different physical
servers--and both remain fully functional though most of the migration--and
it really is near-seamless from the viewpoint of the users--who notice very
little change.
There does come a crunch point where, for example, Offline Files users must
have their settings changed--something I believe was not in that 200 page
document. Lots of little details to deal with. Because SBS is normally
limited to a single DC to the domain, there's a special exception in the
installation process that allows 3 weeks from start to completion before the
old server starts rebooting once an hour. I needed most of that time..
We have a fairly complex setup for an SBS install--30 users, an AIX5 unix
server and a Linux based phone system that has phones that work over TCP/IP
and can be used in the office or across the Internet.
For those who enjoy reading sagas, I'll recount my adventure of yesterday,
which confirms my rank amateur status as a network admin and security minded
person:
An administrator handed me his sons laptop which had been exhibiting
symptoms of a failing hard disk. Indeed, at first boot attempt, the bios
did not recognize the existence of the drive. However, on second attempt,
it started just fine, so my first impulse was to do a full backup to a LAN
based Windows Home Server machine as soon as possible.
During the backup I became aware (via about a dozen randomly named
executables in TEMP) of the the machine—that it was infected.
I installed and updated definitions for Microsoft Security Essentials, which
commenced to clean up the mess—the major piece of which seems to have been
win32\Sality.AM.
In the mean time, however, the critter had been pumping out spam as fast as
the gigabyte LAN and (much slower) DSL NAT connection allowed, and we were
blacklisted on the CBL. It took me nearly a day to understand what had
happened, ensure that the machine was clean, and delist us.
At least I've now got the full attention of senior management with regard to
security risks. They are ready to ban connection of machines from offsite,
but I'm exploring several ways to mitigate this issue with going to that
length.