Jesse Johnston said in news:
[email protected]:
Is it possible to infect your computer with a virus through webmail?
While there are vulnerabilities when using IE to browse web sites, I doubt Yahoo's web pages incorporate nasty content. If you are worried, disable ActiveX and scripting in the Internet security zone (or set them to Prompt). For sites that you trust, and if you set ActiveX and scripting to Prompt, and if you get tired of answering the prompts for sites that you trust, put them in the Trusted security zone.
Make sure the security zone configured in your e-mail client uses the Restricted Sites security zone, and that the Restricted Sites security zone is configured for its High setting. None of the security zones will block linked images which can be used for web bugs. I use SpamPal and its HTML-Modify plug-in to eradicate linked images (along with other nasty HTML content). Good senders should be embedding images (i.e., inline) in their messages (if images are even needed).
There does seem a vulnerability in all browsers regarding an encoded inline MIME part that delivers executable code but declares a different filetype. You get an e-mail. It has a MIME part. Its disposition is "inline" which means the client is supposed to render the content of the MIME part within the body of the message when viewed rather than provide a link as an attachment. This can be used, for example, to play music while the recipient reads the e-mail. The MIME part also specifies the filename for the MIME part. I have seen inline MIME parts whose content was something *other* than the filetype specified. For example, you could get a script encoded in the MIME part that was declared a .jpg filetype which was disposition=inline (so all the protection of multiple prompts to save the attachment are bypassed).
The only way that I can think of to avoid this covert delivery of content that is different than filetype specified by a MIME part would be to:
1 - Force all inline MIME parts to change their disposition to "attach" so they become attachments and will never get rendered within the message.
2 - Sniff the contents of the MIME part to see if it indeed matched the filetype declared for the MIME part. The MIME part is interrogated enough to determine what should be its filetype. This would require a large number of content handlers so many types of content could be sniffed to determine if they were scripts, executables, JPG images, .doc files, or whatever.
Method 1 would cause all sorts of problems amongst good senders that want to use inline MIME content. It would also violate the RFCs in corrupting e-mail content to obviate the use of inline MIME content. There are good uses for inline MIME content, but it can be abused. Method 2 requires lots of content handlers to deciper the filetype when interrogating the encoded content of a MIME part, and as a consequence adds overhead and slows rendering of the message. In Windows XP SP-2 (which, remember, is still *beta*), it looks like MIME sniffing gets added (which is part of the security zones so it is not just an IE fix, so Outlook and OE should benefit, too); see
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/winxppro/maintain/sp2brows.mspx and search on "sniff" or read the section "Zone Settings for MIME Sniffing".
Do any of the other "better" browsers already provide their own MIME sniffing? If so, is there a list of what filetypes they have handlers for (so we users really know how effective is their sniffing by knowing the range of filetype handlers they can use)? If none of the other claimed better browsers included MIME sniffing on their own then they are just as vulnerable (i.e., they are in the same leaky boat as IE).