They would need to be ipsec certificates or possibly machine certificates as
described in KB article below. I don't have experience with stand alone CA -
only enterprise. However both certificates must chain to a "trusted" Certificate
Authority. In other words in a W2K environment, it would work fine if all the
certificates were issued from any CA as long as the certificate being presented
for machine authentication is issued from a CA that the target machine trusts
such as is the case when you want to set up a ssl session with a website, their
certificate must be issued from a CA that your computer trusts and it works that
way for both ends of the connection for ipsec since it is mutual
authentication. You can view the trusted CA's via the mmc certificate snapin for
computer for ipsec. You can import a W2K CA's certificate in to a computer
trusted CA store by either by first exporting it to a .cer file and then
importing or using Web Enrollment to request it. In Active Directory, the
Enterprise CA is trusted by all domain members.
http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;en-us;253498
A computer does not need to contact a CA before engaging in ipsec
communications. However it may want to check a published Certificate Revocation
List periodically to check for any revoked certificates. I am not sure how that
is set up in a non AD computers, though I believe that the CRL can be retrieved
via Web Enroll on non AD machines. However according to the information in the
second link below, CRL checking is disabled by default for ipsec. --- Steve
http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;en-us;313281
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/tr...prodtechnol/windows2000serv/howto/ipsecwt.asp
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/tr...indows2000serv/evaluate/featfunc/pkiintro.asp
Hans said:
Right, preshared = bad... bad preshared. So that leaves me with two last questions.
Great, so say we go with certificates. What kind do they have to be? They
can obviously be from the Microsoft 2000 CA - what type are they (X.509) or
should they be?
Once the machines have Certs, do they need to contact the CA before talking
IPSEC to confirm the validity of the Cert on the remote endpoint? (Much like in
a scenario when a user goes to an SSL enabled website, they must ask the 3rd
party (Verisign) whether the Cert from the web server is kosher (so to speak)).
Or can we get by without ANY communication to the CA? (After the Cert is
deployed.)
Your help has been most appreciated and very helpful! I have been reading
around other posts (before I posted) but the question of trust and how it works
isn't discussed much. I very much like the FreeSWAN idea of 'opportunistic
encryption' - if only that was a reality now.