Hello Kerry
,
This "tweak" only works the way implied in this thread and the referenced
site when logged in with an administrator account.
The benefit in this scenario is that applications that do not request
elevated privileges will not receive them.
In the context of malware, you are absolutely correct - it would be just as
bad to turn UAC completely off, as this setting takes the control out of the
user's hands - applications will get exactly however much privilege they
request, without giving the user a chance to intercede.
However, properly-written applications that correctly request the minimum
privilege they need will still have limited privileges, which provides some
security benefits that would not be available if UAC were completely
disabled (such as IE protected mode).
In either case, this setting does severely weaken UAC, as it takes the C out
of UAC (the "control" part). By changing this setting, one again gives
implicit control of their system back to whatever programs they run. Sure,
some programs may "play nice" by requesting limited privileges... BUT, the
real question here, is do you implicitly trust every program that you run
(or may somehow be ran on your system) to "play nice", knowing that they can
request admin privileges and receive them without you being notified?
It seems some people don't care how much privileges the programs that they
run have over their computer. They must think that if they are running a
program then that signifies their trust in the program and they wouldn't run
it otherwise. Personally, I think that's crazy, especially in today's
interconnected world, but to each their own. I don't want AIM or Notepad to
be able to open up an administrative program that can format my hard drive
without my permission, lol.
Also, the website that contains this tip seems to imply that this same
behavior can be applied to non-administrator accounts. This is false. There
is no mechanism to allow "automatic" elevation in a non-administrator
account, because the credentials of an administrator are required for
elevation to occur. UAC must have the account name and password of an
administrator to elevate an app from inside of a standard user account, and
it must have the user/administrator type this info in.
Accordingly, the only options for the policy "User Account Control: Behavior
of the elevation prompt for standard users" are Prompt for Credentials and
Automatically Deny Elevation Requests.