There are exploits in IE relating to cookies, which have been patched.
Even AFTER patching, scripts can be hidden in cookies, by design.
That means they represent a higher risk than "text files".
Any scripts embedded are supposed to be treated as if they were
scripts on the web page itself
Why would one want to facilitate this, given realities such as banner
ads that are common across domains, etc.?
I'll still say that cookies are generally safe to leave enabled.
I do too - but I no longer claim they are as harmless as "just text
files". If I could trust the OS to not run them as scripts, I'd be
happier, but to rely on a "protection" mechanism that has already
failed and had to be patched, is ungood.
The more you disable, the more you reduce the attack surface but is
whether the functionality of cookies is useful enough to keep
Generally I agree, though there is a case to be made for limiting
cookies in various ways, e.g...
- killing cookies from known bad guys, a la Spyware Blaster
- possibly limiting cookies to Trusted Zone
- using a web browser that doesn't run scripts in cookies
I'm also bracing myself for the need to revise this assessment, i.e.
if malware begins to explit cookies as a way of dropping scripts.
I agree that disabling file and print sharing, or at least the default drive
shares, is part of hardening a system. That's why MBSA reports this. My
original reply was intended to say that what BobW is seeing is the normal
out-of-the-box configuration for XP Pro and doesn't indicate an exploit
That is true, yes. I don't consider MS duhfaults to be compatible
with safe computing practice, even post-SP2, but your point that these
settings don't indicate interference (unless the user had applied
non-default settings as protection, and this has been reverted) is
well made. IMO, unless you have some dependency on those c$, d$, e$
etc. admin shares, I would most definitely disable them.
There's no way to disable IPC$ beyond the current runtime, and the
associated RPC risk is more effectively managed in other ways
(firewall, patching the RPC service, preventing RPC failures from
restarting the whole system)
As an aside, most large ISPs block the ports used by Windows file
sharing from crossing the Internet, but obviously one shouldn't
rely on this protection.
That's nice to know, and may be a new practice, given Opaserv mileage
(Opaserv spreads purely via F&PS, and spread well) and more recent
mileage (my bro-in-law hooked into his home PC via the Internet from
his iPaq in the field, and that worked via F&PS as recently as 2004).